Legal Social Construct
Chapter 3 states that “law embodies common meanings that ensure that people live in a communitarian world, that is, a `rational` world based on common sense and social harmonization, where some statements are considered arguments but others are not, and some arguments are better than others” (66). It also asserts that `what matters in law is not what is logically irresistible, but what works in practice in a particular society` (66). Hitting your children is not illegal in England, at least as long as you don`t leave physical signs of bruising, but there is currently a law in the Welsh Parliament that aims to completely ban corporal punishment of children by parents. It looks like this will happen in the near future. NB This article does not pass judgment on the morality of any of the above acts or laws, it is simply intended to emphasize the extent to which the crime is socially constructed. The second part, `The interpretation of international law`, comprises chapters 4 to 8 and `applies to international law the constructivist approach described in Part I` (4). Chapter 4 claims that the 2007 ban made smoking illegal in public spaces such as public transport and bars. For more information on the history behind drug legalizations, see this link – Chapter 5 addresses the following question: “If international law is socially constructed, who is `directly` involved in its construction?” (141, emphasis added) The chapter examines the role of “states”, “international organizations”, “individuals”, “trans-state actors”, “counter-state actors” and “sui generis actors” (x). She argues that Barnett`s approach to legal thought stems from the practices and assumptions of the social sciences, particularly sociology, rather than those of critical legal studies.
Its main concern is social issues, the content of which differs from economic issues. In tackling the conceptual framework and quantitative techniques of macrosociology, he considers a rarely studied subject and uses a rarely used approach. Lockdown laws are one of the best examples of the social construction of crime – they suddenly came into effect in the spring of 2020 and are still under constant review. In addition, there are also local restrictions, so laws vary from region to region! This book does not interact with contemporary debates in philosophy. Here are a few examples. When asked what the law is, there is no discussion of Hart, Dworkin, Coleman or Raz. (In some cases, there are quick gestures for their work.) As for the nature of global justice, the only reference to Rawls` The Law of Peoples is in one footnote and the only references to Pogge are in four footnotes. The author repeatedly rejects the idea that law is like a mountain and that legal analysis can and should be done using the scientific method. However, I do not know of any philosopher who holds these views. Focarelli takes controversial positions in metaethics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of logic without discussing contemporary literature. For example, he asserts that “deductive reasoning proceeds syllogistically by drawing a conclusion from a large and a small premise” (67), and seems to ignore that this theory of the nature of deduction contradicts much of the literature. Chapter 2 states that law “is what is considered by a group as a whole as its law” (34) and that “the social construction of law is ultimately based on myth” (43).
He asserts that “myth is a narrative that refers to a reality that is not mythical in itself by revealing it as mythical from the point of view of another lived reality that can potentially be revealed as mythical” (47). A key idea in the sociology of crime and deviance is that crime is socially constructed, meaning that whether an act is criminal or not is determined by social processes. In the case of crime, the introduction of new parliamentary laws that amend the law constantly changes the nature of crime. A view currently popular among legal positivists is that law is a social construct. Many of the same legal philosophers also argue that before you can study law empirically, you need to know what it is. At the heart of this article is the assertion that these two theses are incoherent. He presents the dilemma: if law is a social construct like all other social constructions, then philosophers of law must explain what philosophers must bring to their understanding. Studies of social constructs are usually conducted by historians, sociologists, and others who explain them (and what they are) based on empirical data. If, as legal philosophers claim, conceptual clarification must be preceded by empirical work, it follows that the absence of conceptual work on the nature of other social constructions makes any empirical work on them suspect.
To avoid such a radical conclusion, legal philosophers might instead argue that law is a social construct of a particular type. But to say this is to undermine the premise with which the dispute began. Moreover, this response to the dilemma of what is now seen as what separates legal positivism from natural law theory collapses, undermining the motivation for this view. I conclude the essay by proposing a different solution to the dilemma by suggesting that it shows that the fundamental debates of legal philosophy are not conceptual but political. Actions that restrict (or allow) the use of psychoactive substances are in themselves useful examples to illustrate how “crime” is socially constructed. As the UK has tightened its drug laws, more and more US states have legalised the cultivation and sale of cannabis. NB The law technically didn`t make it illegal for you and your friends to host a rave, it just allows the police to disperse it, issue a restraining order against you, and then arrest you next time for violating the injunction. Therefore, there are many things that were not illegal in the past, that are criminal and therefore illegal now.
In 2016, the sale of so-called “legal highs” such as Spice was made illegal by the Psychoactive Substances Act. In 1994, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 aimed to combat anti-social behaviour. It effectively gave police new powers to break raves or an informal gathering of 100 or more people listening to music with a series of repetitive beats. This chapter examines nine “theoretical models of international law”: “naturalism, positivism, realism, axiologist, deconstructivism, sociology, constitutionalism, administration and Third Worldism” (4). Chapter 8 states that `it is difficult to draw definitive legal conclusions [from the concept of obligations erga omnes] and that humanitarian interventions are not permitted under the doctrine of responsibility to protect (RtoP) unless ordered by the UN Security Council on a case-by-case basis` (462).
